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This paper analyzes court priority queuing behavior by examining the time lapse between
when a case enters a court’s docket and when it is ultimately disposed of. Using data
from the Supreme courts of the United States, Massachusetts, and Canada we show
that each court’s docket features a slow decay with a decreasing tail. This demonstrates
that, in each of the courts examined, the vast majority of cases are resolved relatively
quickly, while there remains a small number of outlier cases that take an extremely long
time to resolve. We discuss the implications for this on legal systems, the study of the
law, and future research.
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INTRODUCTION
The patterns with which courts resolve cases is a core aspect of how a judicial system functions, yet
one that has remained largely unexplored in the empirical literature. Understanding the underlying
distribution of case resolution timing can help us better understand both how the courts function
as part of the legal system, while also providing a new dimension of insight into courts, enabling
more nuanced comparisons and analyses. This article is the first to model case resolution timing
distributions, showing that courts feature a slow decay with a decreasing tail.
We will proceed in four parts, first we will provide an overview of modeling priority queuing
behavior, briefly discussing how it has been applied in other substantive fields andwhat implications
priority queues have for courts. We will then describe our data collection and analysis methods
followed by a model for court case priority queueing, an empirical demonstration, and finally a
brief discussion of the implications these findings have.
Overview
Modeling and measuring the priority queuing behavior of courts contributes to the growing body
of legal complex systems research. This body of work attempts to describe and understand the
dynamics of the law at the system level, revealing universalities and emergent phenomena that had
gone largely unnoticed under the traditional doctrinal focus of legal researchers.
Legal complex systems research has focused on examining legal systems from a wide variety
of perspectives. Much work has focused on judicial opinions and the structure of the precedent
citation network. For instance, Fowler and colleagues explored opinion centrality and how it relates
to an opinion’s perceived importance [1, 2]. Building on this work, Whalen et al. examine which
backwards citation patterns relate to an opinion’s future forward citation centrality [3] and the
general trend toward an increase in network-focused legal studies [4].
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Although the body of legal complex systems research is
relatively new, the trend toward increasingly computational and
system-level legal research represents an important movement
within legal research [5, 6]. Traditional legal research has
tended to focus on doctrinal analysis, and has featured a strong
normative component. Although this remains an important
approach for legal research to take, there is much to be gained
from drawing on developments in other fields.
One key area where complex systems and computational
researchers have made substantial progress is in describing and
understanding how individual agent-level behaviors can lead to
emergent system-level patterns. This is often done using agent-
based model simulations. In a well-known example, the Schelling
[7] model uses the behavior of individual agents to explain
the emergence of racial segregation, even in populations that
have low levels of preference for racial homophily. Others have
expanded agent based models in attempts to simulate large and
complex social systems [8]. However, these agent-level studies
need not rely on simulation and can also be empirical in nature,
measuring individual behavior and attempting to describe and
understand the patterns that underlie it.
Such is the case with research exploring the timing
distribution of human behavior. This body of research has
demonstrated that the timing of human actions in many domains
is not randomly distributed, but rather correlated or bursty
[9, 10]. Within this context of studying the timing of human
behavior, priority queuing theory has emerged to help describe
and understand the processes through which agents choose to
execute tasks from a queue. Researchers have used inter-event
timing to explore how agents behave in a variety of contexts,
including how they respond to emails [9, 11], how they execute
tasks in online games [12], and how they prioritize the updating
of academic articles [13].
Task queuing by legal actors has yet to be empirically
examined. Inmany ways, such examinations offer similar benefits
and potential insights as queuing research in other substantive
domains. Modeling queuing behavior helps us understand the
underlying dynamics, how those dynamics lead to system-level
patterns, and in some cases, can help guide assessment or
optimization efforts. However, despite the similarities between
legal priority queues and fields that have been studied, the details
of how the queuing occurs will differ. Unlike more commonly
studied domains such as human communication patterns, or
simple assigned task management, queuing in many legal
contexts does not rely solely on the task management preferences
of a single agent. Rather, these processes are the outcome of
the interplay between many different agents and factors. For
instance, the case docket queuemanagement of a court implicates
the preferences of judges, clerks, and court officials, but perhaps
more importantly depends on case complexity, the actions of
the parties and their representation, and the number of motions
made.
There are diverse factors that can influence case pendency.
Especially at the lower court levels, the number of motions
made by parties is an important factor in determining how long
the court will take to resolve a dispute. Political, economic, or
social expediency can also affect pendency time. Concerns about
potential harm while a dispute remains unresolved can lead
courts to prioritize a pressing dispute over other cases that are
less time sensitive. The number and complexity of the underlying
legal issues in a dispute can also influence the length of time
it takes for a court to dispose of the case. Cases with relatively
few simple issues are easier for the court to resolve and remove
from its docket. On the other hand, cases with many discrete
legal issues, or issues that do not have a clear answer are likely
to take the court more time to resolve. Disagreement amongst
judges—at least for courts that hear cases as a panel—can also
influence the degree of time it takes for the court to dispose of a
case. When there are contending viewpoints among judges about
how an issue should be resolved, courts may take more time in an
attempt to reach consensus [14].
We focus below on measuring and interpreting case queue
resolution in three different courts. Modeling court case priority
queuing can provide new perspective on courts. Traditional ways
of empirically assessing courts include attempting to describe
their ideological leanings [15–17], or the quality of their opinions
[18]. Assessing courts in these ways allow us to better describe,
understand, and compare them. Similarly, measuring court case
priority queuing will provide a new dimension of insight into
courts, allowing us to better understand the temporal dynamics
of how they function.
In addition to its descriptive value, modeling case priority
queues has the potential to provide insight into judicial efficiency,
a pressing issue in many jurisdictions. For instance, following
a landmark ruling in R. v. Jordan (2016)—finding that the
constitutional right to trial within a reasonable time requires
trials to be completed within 18–30 months depending on
their procedural posture—criminal courts in Canada are facing
increased pressure to quickly dispose of cases. This pressure has
led to multiple cases of the accused being freed after courts
have been unable to hear their trials within the newly-imposed
time limits. Measuring and modeling case priority queueing can
provide insight into court behavior and those cases at themargins
that take much longer than the norm.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
We begin by accessing the docket records from various high
courts and explain how “queuing models” provide insights into
the priority in human and judicial dynamics.
Data Collection
To answer these questions, we utilized the publically available
docket history data from three different courts. Because there is
no easily accessible, andmachine readable public database of case
docket histories, we collected data by downloading official court
websites containing docket information including status of cases,
both pending and decided.We download cases from the supreme
courts of the United States, Canada, and Massachusetts.
We access the information of court cases by searching the
court docket number and dates of proceedings of any case (See
Table 1 for demonstration). Included in our sample are 24,607
case dockets from the Supreme Court of the United States
(2001–2015), 2,739 case dockets from the Supreme Court of
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TABLE 1 | Proceedings of Canadian Supreme Court, docket number 25355.
Date Proceeding Filed by (if
applicable)
1999-01-11 Formal judgment sent to the registrar of
the court of appeal and all parties
1999-01-11 Copy of formal judgment being prepared
1999-01-05 Record returned to the Registrar of the
Court of Appeal
1998-11-04 Notice of deposit of judgment sent to all
parties, all parties
… …
… …
… …
1996-08-23 All materials on application for leave
submitted to the Judges, LaF Co Ma
1996-07-03 Respondent’s response on the application
for leave to appeal, 5 copies, with service,
Completed on: 1996-07-03
Metropolitan Trust
Company of
Canada
1996-06-25 Proof of service, of leave application
(admitted on June 3, 4 and 5 June)
1996-06-03 Affidavit, of Gary A. Nelson (included in the
application for leave to appeal)
Dancorp
Developments Ltd.
1996-06-03 Motion to extend the time to file and or
serve the application for leave to appeal,
(included in the application for leave to
appeal)
Dancorp
Developments Ltd.
5 copies, Completed on: 1996-06-03
Canada (1983–2015), and 2,307 court dockets from the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts (1992–2016). As an example, in Table 1
we demonstrate the proceedings and the corresponding dates
of the case Dancorp Developments Ltd. v. Metropolitan Trust
Company of Canada, et al. in Supreme Court of Canada. This
case’s leave to appeal was filed with the court on 1996/06/03 and
formal judgement was delivered on 1999/01/11. In our study,
we estimate the time to decision of the case, i.e., the difference
between date of filing the case and date on which it is disposed of.
Modeling and Empirical Analysis Methods
Drawing upon prior studies on bursts in human dynamics, we
adopt the queueing theory framework [9, 19–21] to model the
updating mechanism in supreme court cases. Similar to queueing
systems in human dynamics, a court in judicial system prioritizes
the proceedings of the court by assigning new dates based on
some protocols. As in the model proposed by Jo et al. [13], in
this work we present a microscopic approach in which a Supreme
court follows priority of two types: a task with time varying
priority and another task with random priority.
At each time step t, a task y(t) increases as a power-law with
time, with y(0) = 0. The priority of the power-law increasing
priority task increases to a maximum value of 1. Execution of the
task is completed once y(t) reaches the value of 1. Following the
work by [13], the priority y(t) is given as:
y (t) = y0
(
t
d
)β
if t < tc; y (t) = 1 if t ≥ tc (1)
Where, tc ≡ d/y
β
0 satisfying the condition y (tc) = 1, the
scale factor d acts a quantifier of deadline to the task, y0 is
interpreted as intrinsic priority of the task draw from the uniform
distribution of (0, 1), and the exponent β serves as a controller
of speed of priority [13]. If the priority task is executed with
probability p, the waiting time distribution P (x) is obtained by:
P (x) =
∫ 1
0
dy0
[
x−1∏
t=0
{
p
[
1− y (t)
]
+
1− p
2
}][
py (x)+
1− p
2
]
= px+1
∫ 1
0
dy0
[
x−1∏
t=0
[1− y (t)+ ǫ]
] [
y (x)+ ǫ
]
(2)
Where ǫ ≡
1−p
2p Jo et al. [13]. In the limit of ǫ ≪ 1 the product
term of the above equation is approximated as:
∏x−1
t=0
[
1− y (t)+ ǫ
]
≈ 1−
∑x−1
t=0
[y (t)− ǫ] (3)
Adopting the above approximation and utilizing the waiting time
distribution obtained by Jo et al. [13], approximated in the limit
x ≪ d we obtain the distribution of time to court decision as:
P (x) ≈ px+1
∫ 1
0
dy0
[
1+ ǫx− y0
x−1∑
t=0
(
t
d
)β][
y0
( x
d
)β
+ ǫ
]
(4)
Where, p is the probability with which a Supreme court case
is disposed of with high priority. The above equation can be
reformulated as:
P (x) ≈ px+1
[
1
2
( x
d
)β
+
ǫd
2
( x
d
)β+1
−
ǫd
2 (β + 1)
(
x− 1
d
)β+1
−
d
3 (β + 1)
( x
d
)β (x−1
d
)β+1
+ ǫ (1+ ǫx)
]
(5)
In the limit of ǫx ≪ 1 the above equation (Equation 5) is
approximated as:
P (x) ≈
[
1
2
( x
d
)β
+ ǫ
]
e−x/xc(p) (6)
Next, following the work on decreasing priority by Jo et al.
[13], we consider a task y(t) which is changing in time with
algebraically decreasing priority as
y (t) =
y0
(t + 1 EQ )γ
(7)
Where γ is the controlling parameter for the decreasing power-
law priority. Implementing the above equation in Equation (2)
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we get the waiting time distribution as:
P (x)
≈ px+1
{
(x+ 1)γ−1
x+ 2
[
(1+ ǫ)x+2−
(
1+ ǫ−
1
(x+ 1)γ
)x+2]
− (x+ 1)γ−1
[
ǫ +
1
(x+ 1)γ
] [
1+ ǫ −
1
(x+ 1)γ
]x+1
+ (x+ 1)γ−1 ǫ (1+ ǫ)x+1
}
(8)
Using the approximation in Equation (3) and in the limit γ ≫ 1
we obtain the distribution of waiting times as:
P(x) ≈ px+1
{
1
2 (x+ 1)γ
−
1− x1−γ
3 (γ − 1) (x+ 1)γ
+ǫ
[
1−
1− x1−γ
2 (γ − 1)
+
x
2 (x+ 1)γ
]
+ ǫ2x
}
(9)
As mentioned by Jo et al. [13], using the condition of γ ≫ 1 and
ǫx≪ 1 we get the approximate waiting time distribution as
P(x) ≈
[(
1
2
−
1
3γ
)
x−γ + ǫ
(
1−
1
2γ
)]
e−x/xc(p) (10)
The above approximated equations (Equations 6, 10) are next
used to explain the distribution of time to decision in the
three Supreme court cases registered in the US, Canada and
Massachusetts. For the range of ǫ1/β ≪ x
d
≪ 1, the time to
decision is dominated by the first term in Equation (6), which
is approximated as a power-law increasing distribution function
[13]. We observe that the empirical distributions of time to final
decision in Supreme courts fit reasonably well with the functional
form described in Equation (6).
RESULTS
We next empirically demonstrate the priority queueing model
observable in the dockets of the supreme courts of the
United States, Canada, and Massachusetts. We plot the time to
decision (measured in days) for case disposal in the supreme
courts of the US (♦), Canada (+), andMassachusetts (∗) as shown
in Figure 1. In all the three cases, the data is fitted by the form
P (x) ∝ (xa + b)e−x/c (11)
Where, a, b, and c are the fitting parameters. The estimated
parameters are shown in Table 2.
For each Supreme court, we ignore the extremely large
decision times due to uncertainty in fitting. We observe that
Canadian Supreme Court takes longest time to decision, while
SCOTUS is the fastest to dispose of court cases. This is also
reflected in the fitting parameter c, where c ∼ 583 (±2.778)
for Canadian Supreme Court, c ∼ 205.98 (±1.708) for Supreme
Court of Massachusetts and, c ∼ 80.149 (±0.647) for SCOTUS.
As is evident from the plot in Figure 1, c indicates the point
where the distribution of decision times makes a transition
from slow decay to faster decay. We observe that the fitting
parameter a for the three supreme courts is less than 1, and b is
negative suggesting that the distribution neither fits to a perfect
power-law increasing nor power-law decreasing priority. On the
contrary, the distributions are rather a mixture of slow decay and
a decreasing tail which fits well with the functional form P(x) ∝
x−αe
− x
β where, α = 1.001 (±0.031) and β = 203.5 (±8.2)
for SCOTUS, and α = 0.898 (±0.045) ; β = 300 (±9.5) for
Supreme Court of Massachusetts, and α = 0.370 (±0.014); β =
957 (±13) for Supreme Court of Canada.
We rescaled the absolute value of decision times for each
court decision by average decision time per court < x >, and
interestingly we observe the rescaled decision times xf =
x
<x>
collapse into a universal curve (See Figure 1 inset). The choice of
rescaling is akin to citation distribution in academic institutions
and journals [22] and earthquake inter-time distributions [23].
Irrespective of the wide variation in the fitting parameters of the
three different courts, the rescaled distribution fits well with the
priority model of the form
P
(
xf
)
∝ (xaf + b)e
−xf/c (12)
Where a, b, and c are the fitting parameters of the collapsed data
of rescaled decision times (See Table 2 for fitting parameters).
We fit the tail of the three rescaled distributions by using the
functional form of P (x) ∝ x−αe
− x
β , where α = 0.169 ± 0.003
and β = 1.052 ± 0.006 are the parameters of the fit. The
distribution of the rescaled time to decision for all the three
Supreme courts shows a universal phenomenon—mixed priority
comprising of a slow decay similar to constant priority along with
a faster decay typical of a power-law with exponential cut-off.
Our empirical findings also provide evidence of a “performance”
metric for the three courts. While the SCOTUS and SC of MA
get involved and resolves cases almost immediately, the SC of
Canada resolves cases much more slowly. The time to decision
of a court case can be comprehended as a queueing process from
the point of view of judicial referees, akin to the review process
in scientific papers [13]. In this model, as cases are filed in a
court, the court assigns an initial priority to every case, depending
on the significance and importance of the case. The priority of
providing final judgement of a case remains almost constant
in time, before falling off rapidly as a court attempts to give a
final verdict. As observed in scientific gatekeeping [13], a slow
decay priority mixed with bimodal combination of power-law
and exponential distributions of judgement timings explains the
distribution of disposal times of Supreme court cases (Figure 1).
DISCUSSION
The time to decision of a court case can be understood as
a queueing process featuring a mixture of slow decay with
a decreasing tail. The functional form of the tail of time to
decision is similar to the review process in scientific papers
[13]. This sort of highly-skewed distribution means that the
vast majority of cases are disposed of within a relatively short
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FIGURE 1 | Probability distributions of time to decision for different courts. The distribution is plotted for the time to decision in the SCOTUS, the Supreme court of
Canada, and the Supreme Court of Massachusetts. The inset shows the fit of the distribution of the rescaled data. The data are fitted by the functional form
P (x) ∝ (xa + b)e−x/c. We present (a, b, c), the parameters of the fit in Table 2.
TABLE 2 | Fitting parameters for three Supreme court decision times.
Supreme courts Fitting parameters
a ± s.e. b ± s.e. c ± s.e.
SCOTUS 0.153 ± 0.00304 −0.209 ± 0.0125 80.149 ± 0.647
Canada 0.181 ± 0.00161 −1.186 ± 0.0223 583 ± 2.778
Massachusetts 0.116 ± 0.00256 −0.286 ± 0.0135 205.98 ± 1.708
Rescaled data 0.396 ± 0.0722 0.870 ± 0.0679 0.611 ± 0.0132
The data are fitted by the functional form: P (x) ∝ (xa + b)e−x/c.
period of time, but there remain outlier cases that take extremely
long to work their way through a court’s docket. Immediately
after a case is entered into a court’s docket we see a near
constant priority, with decisions being reached relatively quickly.
Subsequently, in each of the jurisdictions we examine, there is
an eventual transition where priority begins to fall off rapidly
and cases take much longer to reach completion. Each of the
courts we examine share similar functional forms, suggesting
that there is a degree of universality in the way that cases
work their way through a legal system. That said, our findings
are necessarily qualified by the data we were able to analyze.
Limitations in freely available docket data constrained us to
analyzing three common law courts. Courts in different legal
systems—especially civil law systems—or at different levels of
the appeals hierarchy may exhibit different priority queueing
behavior.
Our findings suggest that, as in many other fields (see [9]), the
timing of judicial activity is not randomly or normally distributed
but rather “bursty” in nature. The “bursty” nature of the judicial
activity is reminiscent of Gutenberg-Richter law observed in
earthquake size distribution, Galilean stick-slip dynamics [24],
and various econophysical systems like financial markets [25].
This means that when trying to understand or model judicial
timing, turning to a Poisson process, as many may instinctively
do, would be inappropriate. The highly-skewed distribution of
disposal times means that the majority of cases are disposed
of relatively quickly. For example, the United States Supreme
Court case of Bashir v. US was disposed of in just over 3
months, with the petition for certiorari filed on February 2,
2005 and judgement issued on May 6, 2005. The Bashir case
is notable in that it involved the court vacating and remanding
for further consideration in light of another opinion it had
recently rendered. Other cases though inhabit the long tail of
the distribution and take a very long time to finally dispose of.
The Canadian Supreme Court case of Her Majesty the Queen
v. Daniel Jolivet provides an example of one of these long-tail-
dwelling cases. This case—with the appeal originally filed with the
Supreme Court in 1998, and the appeal finally closed in 2014—
featured numerous motions to extend time, as well as an eventual
re-hearing of the appeal.
Although the three courts we examined follow a similar
functional form, their constants a, b, and c vary significantly.
These can be used to gain some insight into how the courts differ
in their docket timing. For instance, we can see that the higher
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value for c in the Canadian Supreme Court corresponds to a
much later drop off in the function and accordingly a set of cases
that take extremely long for the court to dispose of. However, it is
important to note that the data gathered on each court does not
necessarily follow the same pattern. Different docketing norms at
courts may lead to somewhat different results.
These findings provide another new perspective on legal
complex systems. This small-but-growing body of work attempts
to understand how the law and its operation can be measured,
modeled, and understood at the system level. As an increasing
number of research projects provide insight into more-and-more
aspects of legal systems we begin to gain a fuller picture of
how the law operates at the system level. We see universalities,
and perhaps more importantly, when a full enough picture
is attained will be able to more accurately detect deviations
and plan interventions. The priority queuing results here are
particularly helpful in providing a metric that can be used
to compare courts—and perhaps once more courts have been
modeled develop a taxonomy of case priority queuing. These
results may also prove useful in attempts to simulate legal systems
in the future. Demonstrating a model of case priority queuing—
at least at the level of courts with discretionary appeal—will allow
researchers to create more accurate simulations.
Future Work
This is the first project to examine priority queuing behavior at
courts. It suggests a degree of universality in how courts prioritize
dispute resolution, with the vast majority of cases being resolved
in a relatively short period of time, and a second set of “hard
cases” that take much longer to resolve. There are a number of
avenues for future work to pursue that would help further our
understanding of these results, and expand our understanding of
how legal systems resolve disputes.
Future in depth work at the case level would help provide
more context for the patterns observed here. By examining case
details and trying to understand what elements of a dispute—
whether it be the legal issues implicated, factual patterns, political
aspects of the dispute, or other reasons—lead to it being resolved
in a particularly timely or slow fashion. In addition to close
examination at the case level, these results suggest it would be
useful to perform similar analyses for more courts. Our research
was limited by available data. However, as more high-quality legal
data becomes available it may be possible to expand this analysis
comparing courts in different jurisdictions, at different levels of
the appeals hierarchy, and at different times in history. Doing so
would provide useful insight into the underlying processes that
shape legal systems.
Although we observe a degree of universality in the functional
form that court priority queuing takes, we note that the
courts we examine are all courts of discretionary appeal in
common law jurisdictions. Future work should strive to compare
these results to lower level courts, and courts in civil law
jurisdictions. It is also possible that the method of appointing
judges may be an important factor in determining how cases
are disposed of. Future work should explore a variety of legal
systems to test how truly universal the findings presented here
are.
CONCLUSION
By examining the time to disposal of cases on the dockets of three
supreme courts, we show that judicial priority queueing features
a mixture of slow decay with a decreasing tail. This suggests a
degree of universality in the way judicial systems manage their
dockets as the majority of cases are relatively quickly disposed of,
while a few extremely-lengthy cases occupy the tail of the power
law distribution. This accords with priority queues observed
in other substantive domains, and furthers the position that
the complex system that is the law can potentially be better
understood by modeling emergent phenomena.
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